
Subject: www.whatreallyhappened.com

Posted by [\[sg\]theOne](#) on Thu, 20 Mar 2003 19:20:44 GMT

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havocsnipeThe emty warheads were not in the breach of UN resolutions if they were then UN would have gone to war.

US would of then used that argument to get UN authority to invade Iraq.

Iraq already had them down on the 12000 page report.

besides the emty warheads are a threat to no one.

Iraqi sceintists what use would they when US would take their word.

so that idea was abandend.

Check this out

The top National Security Council official in the war on terror resigned this week for what a NSC spokesman said were personal reasons, but intelligence sources say the move reflects concern that the looming war with Iraq is hurting the fight against terrorism.

<http://www.rense.com/general35/tearr.htm>

LOL

Iraq has been DEFYING THE UN FROM DAY 1. If UN inspectors found nukes a few days ago France and the like would be yelling LOOK INSPECTIONS ARE WORKING. Your a little late on trying to update me, I read that news hours ago.

You mean the 12000 page report that almost mirrored the first one and STILL LACKS INFORMATION ABOUT THEIR 'SUPOSED' desctruction of WHO KNOWS WHAT when no one was looking ?

"Iraqi sceintists what use would they when US would take their word.

so that idea was abandend. " You may want to stick to the same story when spreading lies.

Try not to make it so easy, I can do this stuff off the top of my head.

Edit : You can OBVIOUSLY see here that the UN resolutions on Iraq aren't UNDERSTANDING when it comes to nuclear/bio/chem capable war heads...

The UN

UNSCOM

Reports to the Security Council

25 January 1999

ANNEX D

ACTIONS BY IRAQ TO OBSTRUCT DISARMAMENT

1. The history of the Special Commission's work in Iraq has been plagued by coordinated efforts

to thwart full discovery of Iraq's proscribed programmes. These policies and actions began immediately following the adoption of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). It is against this backdrop that the significant positive and negative results described in the weapons annexes should be seen. What follows is a brief summary of the Commission's current understanding of the evolution of these concealment policies and practices.

2. Immediately following the Gulf war, the Iraqi Presidency collected reports on weapons remaining with Iraq's Armed Forces after the war, including its weapons prohibited by recently adopted resolution 687(1991). Such documents were provided to the Presidency in the spring of 1991. A decision was taken by a high-level committee (one of whose members was Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Tariq Aziz) to provide to the Commission only a portion of its proscribed weapons, their components and production capabilities and stocks. The policy, as deduced from a range of evidence available to the Commission including the initial false Iraq's declarations, was based on the following Iraqi actions:

- provide a portion of their extant weapon stocks, with an emphasis on those, which were least modern.
- retain production capability and the "know-how" documentation necessary to revive programmes when possible
- conceal the full extent of chemical weapons programmes, including its VX project, and retain production equipment and raw materials
- conceal the number and type of BW and CW warheads for proscribed missiles
- conceal indigenous long-range missile production, and retain production capabilities, specifically with respect to guidance systems and missile engines
- conceal the very existence of its offensive biological weapons programme and retain all production capabilities

3. Iraq had initial success in much of its concealment efforts, but, based, presumably, on early experience with the IAEA and the Special Commission in inspection activities, Iraq, took a subsequent decision in late June of 1991 to eliminate some of these retained proscribed materials, on its own, and in secret and in such a way that precise knowledge about what and how much had been destroyed would not be achievable. This decision and action by the high-level committee was a so-called "unilateral destruction". It was taken following an incident in June 1991 when IAEA inspectors, following an inspection that turned confrontational at Abu Ghraib, obtained photographic evidence of retained nuclear weapons production components.

4. Iraq did not admit to its illegal unilateral destruction until March 1992, approximately nine months after the destruction activities, and even then only after the Commission indicated it had evidence that Iraq retained weapons after its supervised destruction. Iraq states that "The unilateral destruction was carried out entirely unrecorded. No written and no visual records were kept, as it was not foreseen that Iraq needed to prove the destruction to anybody." Such an approach also indicates that Iraq intended to pursue a policy of concealment in its relations with

the Commission and the IAEA."

FYI - IAEA = International Atomic Energy Agency
