
Subject: A trip down memory lane w/Saddam courtesy of the U.N.

Posted by [sg]theOne on Thu, 20 Mar 2003 15:03:52 GMT

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I'd love to respond to all that right away (which I suspect some of which but lets try to focus on one topic in particular. A topic you managed to miss was Iraq's clear pattern of concealment & deception. In your 318 paragraphs comprised of 3304 (roughly) words I dont think I saw you cover the IMPORTANT part of the Iraq's resolution violation.

I would like to address one HUMOROUS note ... allow me :

eggmac

The obvious conclusion is that the war was decided on long ago, irrespective of Iraq's actions.

Nothing Iraq could

have done short of full-scale capitulation and "regime change" would have stopped the United States from going to war.

That makes this war a clear case of aggression.

Quiet right by the time frame this section refers to that was around when we 'went' to Afgan. ? So that means Saddam had over a decade to disarm, right?

eggmac

[etc...]and as it[Iraq] struggles desperately to find ways to reconcile questions over biological and chemical agents, the White House has contemptuously

dismissed all efforts. The constant refrain is that time is running out, with no explanation of why the time is so limited. The reason

is simple; it's not because of any imminent threat from Iraq, it's just because the troops are there and ready to go.

Your right again ! George is just *dying* to get back to killing folks...ever since he -stole- the presidency you know.[/sarcasm]

Here's a tip for those tricky questions about bio./chem. agents...stop fucking lying.

The U.N. club house

UNSCOM

Reports to the Security Council

25 January 1999

ANNEX D

ACTIONS BY IRAQ TO OBSTRUCT DISARMAMENT

1. The history of the Special Commission's work in Iraq has been plagued by coordinated efforts to thwart

full discovery of Iraq's proscribed programmes. These policies and actions began immediately following the adoption of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). It is against this backdrop that the significant positive and negative results described in the weapons annexes should be seen.

What follows is a brief summary of the Commission's current understanding of the evolution of

these concealment policies and practices.

2. Immediately following the Gulf war, the Iraqi Presidency collected reports on weapons remaining with Iraq's Armed Forces after the war, including its weapons prohibited by recently adopted resolution 687(1991). Such documents were provided to the Presidency in the spring of 1991. A decision was taken by a high-level committee (one of whose members was Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Tariq Aziz) to provide to the Commission only a portion of its proscribed weapons, their components and production capabilities and stocks. The policy, as deduced from a range of evidence available to the Commission including the initial false Iraq's declarations, was based on the following Iraqi actions:

- provide a portion of their extant weapon stocks, with an emphasis on those, which were least modern.
- retain production capability and the "know-how" documentation necessary to revive programmes when possible
- conceal the full extent of chemical weapons programmes, including its VX project, and retain production equipment and raw materials
- conceal the number and type of BW and CW warheads for proscribed missiles
- conceal indigenous long-range missile production, and retain production capabilities, specifically with respect to guidance systems and missile engines
- conceal the very existence of its offensive biological weapons programme and retain all production capabilities

3. Iraq had initial success in much of its concealment efforts, but, based, presumably, on early experience with the IAEA and the Special Commission in inspection activities, Iraq, took a subsequent decision in late June of 1991 to eliminate some of these retained proscribed materials, on its own, and in secret and in such a way that precise knowledge about what and how much had been destroyed would not be achievable. This decision and action by the high-level committee was a so-called "unilateral destruction". It was taken following an incident in June 1991 when IAEA inspectors, following an inspection that turned confrontational at Abu Ghraib, obtained photographic evidence of retained nuclear weapons production components.

4. Iraq did not admit to its illegal unilateral destruction until March 1992, approximately nine months

after the destruction activities, and even then only after the Commission indicated it had evidence that Iraq retained weapons after its supervised destruction. Iraq states that "The unilateral destruction was carried out entirely unrecorded. No written and no visual records were kept, as it was not foreseen that Iraq needed to prove the destruction to anybody." Such an approach also indicates that Iraq intended to pursue a policy of concealment in its relations with the Commission and the IAEA."

suffiecient amount of the data MYSELF and come to my own conclusions and expessed my conclusions alone here...unlike youself.

Poor Iraq being bullied on by some bad people who are talking about some "checmical" weapons and Saddams just setting there shaking his fucking stupid head..."oh no...we dont have any

time.

Thanks,
The One
