Home » General Discussions » Heated Discussions and Debates » A trip down memory lane w/Saddam courtesy of the U.N.
| A trip down memory lane w/Saddam courtesy of the U.N. [message #8440] |
Fri, 21 March 2003 07:22   |
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[sg]the0ne
Messages: 442
Registered: February 2003
Location: Houston, TX
Karma:
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Commander |
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IAEA Reports to the UN Security Council
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports2.html#Consolidated
UN Resolution 687 -- 1991
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/resolutions/res687.pdf
UN Resolution 1051 -- 1996
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/resolutions/res1051.pdf
UN Resolution 1284 -- 1999
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/resolutions/res1284.htm
| IAEA report to UN on 16 October 2002 |
--THIS IS IN RELATION TO PARAGRAPHS 12 & 13 in Resolution 687 of 1991--
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/s_2002_1150.pdf
Together with the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring,
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), I participated in the second and third rounds of talks
between the Secretary-General and senior representatives of the Government of Iraq. The talks took place
in New York from 1 to 3 May 2002 and in Vienna on 4 and 5 July 2002. The talks provided an opportunity
to clarify with Iraqi officials the requirements for the full implementation of the relevant Security Council
resolutions.
[...etc...]
Following receipt of the letter of 16 September 2002 from the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the Secretary-General (S/2002/1034, annex) conveying the decision of Iraq to allow
the return of the United Nations weapons inspectors without conditions,
[...etc...]
Obtaining Iraq’s concurrence on those practical arrangements is a crucial step towards the re-establishment
of an effective inspection regime, as required by the relevant resolutions.
[...etc...]
As previously indicated to the Security Council, the greater in-depth analysis
carried out since December 1998 of the extensive documentation acquired through the inspection process has
refined but not changed the Agency’s technically coherent picture of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear programme and
nuclear-related capabilities as of December 1998. Although there remain a few questions and concerns regarding
Iraq’s nuclear programme prior to 1998, the clarification of which would reduce uncertainty as to the completeness
of the Agency’s knowledge and understanding of that programme, these questions and concerns do not constitute
“unresolved disarmament issues”, as referred to in Security Council resolution 1284 (1999).
The Agency is continuing to review and assess all available post-1998
information (for example, publications by Member States, open-source data and high-resolution commercial
satellite imagery) as well as Iraq’s recently provided semi-annual declarations. However, as nearly four
years have elapsed since IAEA has been able to implement its Security Council mandate in Iraq, the Agency
remains unable to draw any conclusions with regard to the status of Iraq’s nuclear programme and nuclear-related
capabilities as of today. It will therefore be important for the Agency, on recommencement of inspections,
to resolve, with the highest priority, the key issue of whether there have been any material changes in Iraq’s
nuclear activities and capabilities since December 1998, and whether Iraq is in compliance with its obligations
under the relevant Security Council resolutions.
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| UN Resolution 1284 on Dec. 17th 1999 |
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/resolutions/res1284.htm
Acknowledging the progress made by Iraq towards compliance with the provisions of resolution 687 (1991), but noting
that, as a result of its failure to implement the relevant Council resolutions fully, the conditions do not exist
which would enable the Council to take a decision pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) to lift the prohibitions
referred to in that resolution,
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| IAEA report to UN on July 21st 1995 |
--THIS IS IN RELATION Resolutions 687&751 of 1991--
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/s_1995_604.pdf
(Pages 3 and 4)
Based on the results of these activities and the IAEA’s extensive knowledge of Iraq’s past programme and present
situation, a large number of errors and inconsistencies have been identified in the documents, typified by the following:
Linguistic correctness and conformity with Iraqi practice:
These documents contain technical wording which differs from that
found in the IAEA’s extensive database of seized Iraqi documents and terms which are not in conformance with
standard Iraqi usage.
Conformity of layout and construction of documents with established
Iraqi practices:
The layout of the documents is not consistent with contemporary Iraqi
usage. In addition, the documents reveal errors in construction,
suggesting poor adaptation of authentic Iraqi documents.
Scientific validity:
Some technical elements of the programme, inferred from the documents,
have been assessed as unlikely by experts from Nuclear Weapon States.
Some of those elements are also inconsistent with available
information on the status of Iraq's clandestine programme during the last years of the programme.
Accuracy:
Significant inaccuracies in qualifications, titles and names of
individuals, as well as in technical and administrative organizational
structures, have been clearly established.
As a result of this investigation, the IAEA has reached the conclusion
that, on the basis of all evidence available, these documents are not authentic. Furthermore,
no credible evidence was found to suggest that the activities reported in these
documents were or are being carried out in Iraq.
The investigation undertaken by the IAEA and the basis for its conclusions
have been comprehensively documented. In view, however, of the sensitive nature of the subject and of the process, it is
considered prudent to keep this documentation confidential.
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| The IAEA in a report to the UN on April 22nd 1994 |
--THIS IS IN RELATION TO Resolution 687&751 of 1991--
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/s_1994_490.pdf
X. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
(pages 7 and 
26.
While Iraq has expressed its strong wish for a specific date by which IAEA
would submit to the Security Council the report of Iraq’s compliance with the
relevant paragraphs of resolution 687 (1991), there remain outstanding actions that would need to be completed.
IAEA will have to satisfy itself that it is in a position to implement fully the ongoing monitoring and verification
plan. It is not at this time possible or practical to provide a specific date by which that will happen. The positive
attitude adopted by the Iraqi authorities since the initiation of the high-level talks in the second half of 1993 is
bearing fruit, should be continued and must be encouraged. This will permit the acceleration of the full implementation
of ongoing monitoring and verification.
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Resolution 687 passed in April 8th1991 states the following in point 12 on page 6.
"...Iraq shall undonditionally agree to not aquire or develop nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapos-useable material or any
subsystems or components or any research, developement, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above; so
submit to the Sec.-Gen. & Director Gen. of the IAEA within fifteen days of the adoption of the present
resolution a declaration of the locations, amounts, and types of all items specified above; to place
all of it's nuclear-weapons-useable material under the exclusive control, for custody and removal, of the IAEA."
Iraq's compliance expectations from 1996 concerning the IAEA, you can see in their 2002 report above they've
been doing a bang up job.
http://photos.yahoo.com/bc/aashton@sbcglobal.net/vwp?.dir=/&.dnm=UN+Resolution+1051(1996)+Point.jpg&.src=ph&.view=t&.hires=t
If it's such a freaking well known fact that Iraq has nothing to do with terrorist why is it in the *1991* resolution ?
http://photos.yahoo.com/bc/aashton@sbcglobal.net/vwp?.dir=/&.dnm=UN+Resolution+687+Point+H.+32.jpg&.src=ph&.view=t&.hires=t
FIFTEEN DAYS NOT ALMOST FOUR THOUSAND DAYS
http://photos.yahoo.com/bc/aashton@sbcglobal.net/vwp?.dir=/&.dnm=UN+Resolution+687+Point+8+and.jpg&.src=ph&.view=t&.hires=t
| The UN -- the running joke on March 19th |
Outlining disarmament tasks for Iraq, Blix laments lack of time for inspections
Dr. Hans Blix
19 March – Top United Nations arms inspector Hans Blix today presented a work programme to the Security Council on the
key remaining tasks for disarming Iraq, expressing also his sadness that inspections had run out of time and that
it appeared war was "imminent."
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OH MY GOSH HANS why dont you tell everyone how long YOU HAVE BEEN ON THE CASE ?
The mass media gave ME the impresion that Hanz & the goof troops where new to the situation in Iraq...
the "new UN weapons inspectors". Here is a picture to give everyone a reference point as to how much time Hans
has been beating the Inspections drum AND THEY NEVER GOT PAST THE FIRST HALF OF STEP ONE.
http://photos.yahoo.com/bc/aashton@sbcglobal.net/vwp?.dir=/&.dnm=Hans+=+jerk+off.jpg&.src=ph&.view=t&.hires=t
Short Version : Saddam lie's and tries to conceal & deceive EVERY group that TRIES to inspect & disarm him
HE DOES NOT WANT TO DISARM ON HIS OWN.
Short Version : The chances of you finding your car filled with 100$ bills is the same chance of Saddam
being in compliance with the UN.
The One
yahoo : chapstic25
aim : lamant281
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