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| A trip down memory lane w/Saddam courtesy of the U.N. [message #8098] |
Thu, 20 March 2003 03:02  |
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[sg]the0ne
Messages: 442
Registered: February 2003
Location: Houston, TX
Karma:
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Commander |
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| The U.N.'s UNSCOM Reports to the Security Council |
B. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 707 (1991) AND 715 (1991) --(22 May 1992) [/u]
3. The Secretary-General's report of 7 March 1992 concluded that, despite the vigorous efforts of the Security Council and the Special Commission, Iraq had still not acknowledged its obligations under Council resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) nor had it provided the full, final and complete disclosure of all aspects of its proscribed weapons programmes nor the initial declarations required under the plans for future ongoing monitoring and verification. That report also noted that a high-level Iraqi delegation was due to meet the Security Council in the immediate future and that the solution to the matter lay with Iraq.
III. DEVELOPMENTS ---(21 December 1993)
A. Political developments: the attitude of Iraq
10. The fundamental underlying issue for Iraq was its desire to see an end to the first phase of implementation of its obligations under section C of resolution 687 (1991), e.g., the identification and elimination of proscribed weapons and weapons programmes, and for this to be followed by implementation by the Security Council of paragraph 22 of that resolution, i.e., the lifting of the oil embargo, before proceeding to ongoing monitoring and verification activities. Iraq objected to the destruction of the chemicals and equipment on the grounds that they could be redeployed (despite their obvious and direct connection with the chemical weapons programme) and to the installation of the cameras on the grounds that this would, in effect, constitute ongoing monitoring and verification under resolution 715 (1991), a resolution which Iraq had not yet accepted and whose terms, according to Iraq, were still the subject of discussion between Iraq and the Security Council.Instead, Iraq proposed that action on each of these items await the conclusion of a dialogue on all outstanding issues between it and the Special Commission and IAEA.
C. Iraq's declarations ---(24 June 1994)
24. Since its acceptance of resolution 715 (1991), Iraq has sought to address the Commission's concerns on the provision of data, both in relation to the full, final and complete disclosures and in relation to the declarations of current and recent dual-purpose capabilities due under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification. There remains some doubt, however, that Iraq is fully cooperating in this regard, particularly as it maintains its claim to have destroyed all documentation and not to be able to recall certain key facts. The lack of documentation continues to present the Commission with the problem of how to verify Iraq's account of its programmes and with the problem of what confidence it can have that it has fully accounted for Iraq's banned capabilities. In this regard, the lack of documentation has been one of the principal delaying factors. That said, there has been a marked change for the better in Iraq's willingness to address the Commission's concerns, particularly in relation to current dual-purpose facilities.
II. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS ---(10 April 1995)
(a) Possession by the Commission of a full picture of Iraq's past programmes and a full accounting of the facilities, equipment, items and materials associated with those past programmes, in conjunction with full knowledge of the disposition of dual-purpose items currently available to Iraq, the technologies acquired by Iraq in pursuing the past programmes, and the supplier networks it established to acquire those elements of the programmes that it could not acquire indigenously. This information provides the baseline data from which ongoing monitoring and verification proceeds;
[...]
V. CONCLUSIONS
135.As described elsewhere in the present report, the Commission has continued its investigation in all areas of the past proscribed weapons activities in Iraq and its verification of Iraq's declarations. The Commission has come to the conclusion that Iraq has not provided a full and comprehensive disclosure of its past military biological programme or accounted for items and materials acquired for that programme.
With Iraq's failure to account for the use of these items and materials for legitimate purposes, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that there is a high risk that they had been purchased and used for a proscribed purpose - acquisition of biological warfare agent. The Commission will continue its intensive efforts to elucidate all such outstanding issues arising from this and the other past programmes. It notes that, if Iraq decided to provide full, accurate and verifiable information, such matters could be resolved expeditiously.
B. Concealment investigations---(6 October 1997)
102. The Commission has continued its efforts to understand the full extent and status of Iraq's activities directed towards the retention of proscribed materials and capabilities, after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991). It has obtained a greater understanding of the actions taken by Iraq to retain such capabilities and thus to seek to deceive the Commission regarding the disposition of weapons. However, considerable uncertainty remains concerning the retention by Iraq of prohibited material and the continued existence of concealment systems.
103. Much of the Commission's efforts during recent months have been directed towards the early actions taken by Iraq to retain prohibited weapons. In a period of several months after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), some weapons and material were presented to the Commission by Iraq. Decisions and attendant actions were also taken, at that time, to retain and conceal other proscribed weapons and materials. The Commission and IAEA have investigated this period intensively in order to establish what organizations, acting under what authorities, were involved.
104. In the context of its concealment investigations, the Commission has two fundamental purposes. The first is to determine if all of the proscribed items that were retained have subsequently been revealed or discovered. The second is to ascertain whether the concealment mechanism that was used, at that time, is still functioning. This latter point bears not only on intrinsic accounting for prohibited weapons and items in Iraq's possession, but also on the ongoing monitoring activities of the Commission.
105. The Commission has established several facts concerning the early decisions by Iraq to withhold certain proscribed weapons and capabilities.
106. For example, it is established that Iraq decided, in April 1991, to divide its missile force into two parts. It would present one part to the Commission for destruction and illegally retain the second part. Iraq claims it subsequently decided to destroy the retained missile force, unilaterally. It was claimed that this unilateral destruction took place in July 1991. The Commission has recently been informed by Iraq, however, that some prohibited weapons and materials were still withheld, even after this unilateral destruction, until October 1991. The Commission has conducted several missions with the objective of determining the full picture of these decisions and actions to include who made the decisions, for what rationale, who was involved in the concealment and when and where subsequent destruction decisions were taken. This information is needed in order to be able to verify fully the facts with respect to Iraq's proscribed missile capability.
IV. COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS
Issues of substance
122. Three weapons areas are at issue - missiles, chemical weapons and biological weapons.
Missiles
123. Significant progress has been achieved in the missile area. The Commission is now in a position to be able to account for practically all, except two, imported combat missiles that were once the core of Iraq's proscribed missile force. The Commission has also accounted for all declared operational missile launchers, both imported and indigenously produced. To achieve the ultimate objective of full disposal of Iraq's proscribed operational missile assets, the next important step is to account for proscribed missile warheads. This is of particular importance as the issue overlaps the chemical and biological weapons areas. Once this is accomplished, the Commission's ability to report to the Security Council with confidence that Iraq does not possess a proscribed missile force would greatly increase. Remaining issues, such as accounting for missile propellants, would not be insurmountable if Iraq would cooperate with the Commission and provide the evidence required to complete the process of verification. More work is still required to achieve the same results in the area of Iraq's indigenous production of proscribed missile systems.
Chemical weapons
124. Important progress has been made in this area, of which the recently completed destruction of chemical weapons-related equipment and materials is an example. However, the ability of the Commission to report positively on disarmament of this category of weapons of mass destruction will require the provision by Iraq of much more and accurate material and related access by the Commission relevant to the warheads and VX questions.
Biological weapons
125. This is an area that is unredeemed by progress or any approximation of the known facts of Iraq's programme. The Executive Chairman and UNSCOM experts have made clear repeatedly to their Iraqi counterparts their deep concern about this area, both intrinsically and in terms of its impact upon the overall estimation of Iraq's willingness to abide by the decisions of the Security Council.
126. There is incomprehension of why Iraq is persisting so strongly with both refusing to make the facts known about its biological weapons programme and why it is so insistent on blocking the Commission's own efforts to reach those facts.
127. This perspective on Iraq's biological weapons programme is not the Commission's alone. As is indicated in this report, independent international experts have the same view.
UNSCOM
Reports to the Security Council
25 January 1999
ANNEX D
ACTIONS BY IRAQ TO OBSTRUCT DISARMAMENT
1. The history of the Special Commission's work in Iraq has been plagued by coordinated efforts to thwart full discovery of Iraq's proscribed programmes. These policies and actions began immediately following the adoption of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). It is against this backdrop that the significant positive and negative results described in the weapons annexes should be seen. What follows is a brief summary of the Commission's current understanding of the evolution of these concealment policies and practices.
2. Immediately following the Gulf war, the Iraqi Presidency collected reports on weapons remaining with Iraq's Armed Forces after the war, including its weapons prohibited by recently adopted resolution 687(1991). Such documents were provided to the Presidency in the spring of 1991. A decision was taken by a high-level committee (one of whose members was Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Tariq Aziz) to provide to the Commission only a portion of its proscribed weapons, their components and production capabilities and stocks. The policy, as deduced from a range of evidence available to the Commission including the initial false Iraq's declarations, was based on the following Iraqi actions:
-- provide a portion of their extant weapon stocks, with an emphasis on those, which were least modern.
-- retain production capability and the "know-how" documentation necessary to revive programmes when possible
-- conceal the full extent of chemical weapons programmes, including its VX project, and retain production equipment and raw materials
-- conceal the number and type of BW and CW warheads for proscribed missiles
-- conceal indigenous long-range missile production, and retain production capabilities, specifically with respect to guidance systems and missile engines
-- conceal the very existence of its offensive biological weapons programme and retain all production capabilities
3. Iraq had initial success in much of its concealment efforts, but, based, presumably, on early experience with the IAEA and the Special Commission in inspection activities, Iraq, took a subsequent decision in late June of 1991 to eliminate some of these retained proscribed materials, on its own, and in secret and in such a way that precise knowledge about what and how much had been destroyed would not be achievable. This decision and action by the high-level committee was a so-called "unilateral destruction". It was taken following an incident in June 1991 when IAEA inspectors, following an inspection that turned confrontational at Abu Ghraib, obtained photographic evidence of retained nuclear weapons production components.
4. Iraq did not admit to its illegal unilateral destruction until March 1992, approximately nine months after the destruction activities, and even then only after the Commission indicated it had evidence that Iraq retained weapons after its supervised destruction. Iraq states that "The unilateral destruction was carried out entirely unrecorded. No written and no visual records were kept, as it was not foreseen that Iraq needed to prove the destruction to anybody." Such an approach also indicates that Iraq intended to pursue a policy of concealment in its relations with the Commission and the IAEA."
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Sorry for the long quote but I feel like it drives the point home. For those of you who didn't read it let me give you the jist.
1991-We don't know what Iraq has but we sure wish they'd tell us
1993-We sure wish 2years later we could get past the 1st phase of "identification & elimination"
1994-Iraq says they destroyed all this stuff but no one took any notes, we don't really believe them but man have they been a willing bunch lately!
1995-Fours years later we are still trying to pass the 1st phase of "identification". We don't know what Iraq has but we sure wish they'd tell us
1997-Iraq still hasn't completed the 1st phase of "identification" & we know they are trying to hold on to it.
1999-We know Iraq lied about :
****full extent of weapons stock (they'd 'declare' the weakest ones)
****intending to disarm
****chem weapons stock (VX retention raw materials + prod. capabilities)
****chem/bio warheads
****total concealment of the "full extent of chemical weapons programmes"
****conceal the very existence of its offensive biological weapons programme and retain all production capabilities
****conceal indigenous long-range missile production
2003-"We don't know what Iraq has but we sure wish they'd tell us" & "but man have they been a willing bunch lately!"
This last report posted 1999 and had an EIGHT YEAR TRACK RECORD of similar activities. For EIGHT YEARS Iraq deceived the IRON GRIP ON REALITY of the UN in reference to every major weapons program they had (that WE'VE found out about thus far).
So I do beg the question, again...what are these other options you think we have?
So I do beg the question, what do you think Saddam wants to do with a LONG RANGE MISSLE PROGRAM & CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL/NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES ?
Isn't this helpful ? You'll note several of the statements above are still echoing on today, discovery of long range missiles etc. Or do we need a web cam w/Saddam standing in front of a big fucking sign saying.."I want to kill you in the worst way." before everyone believes it.
So old chap, shall we disarm him before or after the mad man goes nuclear?
*ZIP Forward to the present*
So how much longer would you like to give Iraq to re-arm ? Shall we give him another 12years so he can be in the nuclear club when we go to disarm him ?
But somehow IM THE SADIST BRAINWASHED WAR-MONGER JERKOFF FUCK HEAD who is dying to kill some Iraqi's. Two points
a) I don't want to kill Iraqi's
b) Saddam had already taken that position.
You can continue to quote Michael More author of "Stupid White Men" & "Bowling for Columbine" plus the Dixie Chicks if you like. I on the other side of the coin will chose to quote the U.N. and other reputable sources of information.
And it is absolutely amazing that a)the U.N. require yet ANOTHER RESOLUTION to specificly write out in MULTIFUCKING COLORED CRAYONS what military action needs to be taken b)the U.N. security councel would veto any resolution that addresses this issue.
The One
ps. Duke of Nukes - this is one of those bowls full of facts you requested.
yahoo : chapstic25
aim : lamant281
[Updated on: Thu, 20 March 2003 06:45] Report message to a moderator |
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